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The objective of this paper is to provide an introduction to the economics of 
controlling the stock of carbon-dioxide in the atmosphere. The paper starts with a 
brief summary of the arguments against a wait-and-see strategy and in favour of 
controlling carbon emissions. It then provides a basic analysis of the effect of carbon 
tax on net-cash flow maximising agents’ emissions and offers two possible ways for 
setting the tax rate. The first one computes an atmospheric carbon-dioxide stock-
targeting tax rate with abstinence of some agents, whereas the second considers 
universal cooperation and computes a welfare-maximising carbon-tax rate. While 
these computations assume a fixed rate of depletion of the atmospheric stock of 
carbon dioxide, the last section takes the depletion rate to be dependent on the 
distribution of the usable land between plants and humans and the change in the 
usable land to be dependent on the change in the atmospheric carbon-dioxide stock. 
The usable land allocation required for achieving a target stock of atmospheric carbon 
dioxide is subsequently computed. (JEL Q52, Q54) 
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1. The Carbon-Cycle’s Imbalance and Its Expected Implications 
Carbon emissions are essential for life. In their absence, Earth would become an icy 
planet. However, excessive concentration of carbon-dioxide in the atmosphere would 
render Earth a hot, desolate planet. Global warming is a process where emissions of 
greenhouse gases (GHGs) create conditions that lead to a rise in the temperature of 
the surface of the planet and subsequently to climate change. The principal GHG is 
Carbon Dioxide. It is responsible for about eighty percents of the green-house effect. 
Hence, the accumulation of GHGs reflects mainly the imbalance in the atmospheric 
carbon cycle—the emissions of CO2 by humans, animals and bacteria beyond the 
level absorbed by plants through photosynthesis. Per capita, the largest emitters of 
CO2 are the rich industrialized countries (see Levy et al., 2011, for international 
comparison).  
Monthly measurements of carbon-dioxide concentration in the troposphere 
have begun by Charles Keeling in 1958 at the astronomical observatory below the 
summit of Mt. Mauna Loa (4,169 m) in Hawaii. Taken far away from major source 
and sink sites of carbon-dioxide, those measurements provide a good assessment of   2
the Earth’s background level of atmospheric carbon-dioxide. They form The Keeling 
Curve, which is displayed in Figure 1. The oscillations around this curve reflect 
seasonal variations of the imbalance between humans, animals and bacteria aggregate 
carbon-dioxide emissions, on the one hand, and absorption of carbon dioxide by 





Figure 1. The Keeling Curve 
Source: National Oceanic & Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), U.S. Department 
of Commerce, http://www.esrl.noaa.gov/gmd/ccgg/trends/ 
 
Analyses of bubbles trapped in ice-cores extracted from Antarctica have 
provided indications of concentrations of carbon dioxide in Earth’s atmosphere during 
the earlier 600,000 years. As can be seen from Figure 2, when contrasted with the 
deep historical concentration levels, the Keeling Curve reveals unprecedented levels 
and rate of accumulation of atmospheric carbon dioxide from about 280 particles per 
million on the eve of the Industrial Revolution (1750 AD) to 380 particles per million 
in 2010. The industrialization and modernisation of the developing countries and the   3
deforestation of tropical lands by logging and clearing for cash-crops intensify the 
imbalance in the carbon cycle and strengthen the aforesaid trend.  
 
Figure 2. Historical carbon-dioxide concentrations derived from EPICA (in blue) and 
Vostok (in green) ice cores and The Keeling Curve (in red) 
Source: http://planetforlife.com/co2history/index.html 
 
Figure 3   reveals a high level of positive correlation between temperature 
variation from the present level and carbon-dioxide concentration in the atmosphere. 
The equilibrium climate sensitivity—the global average surface warming of Earth 
following a doubling of the concentration of CO2 in the atmosphere—is assessed to be 
most likely about three degrees Celsius. The subsequent adverse effect of this 
equilibrium climate sensitivity on the level of global output in the twenty-second 
century is assessed to be only a few percents, hence negligible in present value. This 
assessment might lend support to a wait-and-see strategy. However, due to the 
compounded uncertainty embedded in the assembly of the components of the used 
benefit-cost models, the upper-tail of the probability density function of the Earth’s 
surface-temperature change might be fat (Weitzman, 2009, 2011). An increase of six 
degrees Celsius, rather than the expected three, in the Earth’s surface average 
temperature will deprive massive populations of the river-water supply that has been 
essential for their existence. A six-degree Celsius rise will also dilute major ocean 
conveyers. Another argument against a wait-and-see strategy is irreversibility. Since 
carbon-dioxide emissions remain in the atmosphere for many years, the implications   4
of decisions on current emissions for the stock of GHGs are difficult-to-reverse. 
Moreover, the warming of the oceans causes acidification of their waters, hence 
reduces their absorptive capacity of carbon-dioxide and increases the possibility of a 
release of another slowly depleted GHG, methane hydrate, from the continent shelves 




Figure 3. Carbon dioxide and dust concentration and surface temperature variation 
Source: Vostok_Petit_data.svg file 
 
2. Market-Based Control of Carbon Emissions 
Intergenerational ethics and, subsequently, sense of responsibility, ensures assignment 
of significant weights to future benefits and costs by the present generation. In the 
absence of such ethics and sense of responsibility current emissions of carbon-dioxide 
into the atmosphere by one agent are excessive and impose negative external effects 
on other agents and future generations by aggravating the imbalance in the carbon 
cycle and increasing the stock of atmospheric green-house gasses. Failure of private 
initiatives to set markets for negative external effects justifies public intervention. The 
Coase Theorem implies that, as long as transaction costs are sufficiently low, some   5
negative externalities can be moderated by assignment of property rights. However, 
the atmosphere is indivisible: it belongs to all and no one. Moreover, emissions spread 
and the sources of their atmospheric concentration in any given location are 
numerous. Thus, transaction costs, if assignment of property rights were possible, are 
very high.  
The control instruments of carbon emissions (and GHGs in general) at the 
disposal of local, national and international policy makers are classified as standards 
or market-based instruments. The set of market-based instruments includes emission 
trading schemes, emission taxes and abatement subsidies. Emissions trading schemes 
are based on two principles: a cap on aggregate emissions and tradeable emission-
permits that sum up to the cap. The imposition of a cap and allocation of permits 
reduce uncertainty about total emission and its sources. The cap may be changed over 
time so as to meet domestic and/or international targets of emission reductions. The 
assumption underlying the implementation of a carbon-trading scheme is that 
efficiency will be achieved through market-based redistribution of permits. However, 
the redistribution of carbon-emission permits depends on the initial allocation of such 
rights, which might be bias in favour of certain industries and consumers. For 
example, the Australian Federal Government’s Green Paper on Emission Trading of 
July 2008, indicates that firms in carbon-intensive industries such as aluminium 
production and electrical power generation would initially receive free permits and 
other compensations in order to maintain their operation and prevent them from 
moving off-shore. The agricultural sector would not initially be restricted. Other small 
polluters with large aggregate political influence would receive a cent-to-cent 
compensation on any rise in petrol price stemming from the scheme through excise 
tax reduction on petrol. Furthermore, the market of carbon emission permits is 
unlikely to be perfectly competitive. Some traders will be large, better informed and 
more sophisticated and hence will possess a significant market power. The 
implementation of a carbon-emission-trading scheme involves a huge monitoring and 
enforcement effort and is not necessarily the most efficient method. 
An alternative method that does not require huge monitoring and enforcement 
effort is based on application of a uniform carbon-tax rate on the purchasing of inputs 
such as coal and petrol. The carbon-tax rate can be changed over time to meet 
environmental targets. However, the notion of tax is unpopular among consumers and 
governments are influenced by public sentiments. Furthermore, the inclusion of a   6
uniform carbon tax on certain inputs does not provide a perfectly adequate signal, 
hence incentive, to users. For example, the carbon emissions by vehicles vary with 
make, vintage, maintenance, traffic conditions, load and driver’s behaviour. 
Optimally, the carbon tax rate should vary in accordance with these factors. There are 
concerns that carbon-tax might be regressive as the share of spending on utilities, 
electricity in particular, is higher for low-income earners. These concerns serve as an 
argument in favour of subsidy of greener technologies and use of arable land and 
other natural resources. Carbon tax on utilities such as electricity can be made 
progressive for households: no tax up to a certain essential level, and thereafter rising 
along a step-diagram. The carbon-tax rate can be varied over time to meet 
environmental targets. The implementation of carbon tax is perceived to involve 
greater uncertainty about emissions, but lower monitoring and enforcement costs, than 
trading schemes. The effects of carbon-tax on emission-reduction, consumer-goods’ 
prices and welfare depend on the elasticity of demand to goods whose production is 
carbon-fuel intensive. Comparisons of efficiency of price-incentive instruments and 
quota instruments have been provided by Pizer (2002), Hoel and Karp (2002), Newell 
and Pizer (2003) and Fischer and Newell (2008).  
In addition to environmental and economic aspects, the choice of market-
based instruments depends on social and cultural aspects. There is a fear that 
unilateral implementation of emission-tax, in particular, would reduce disposable 
income, worsen terms of trade through price-inflation, and increase unemployment. In 
many countries the introduction of new taxes is very unpopular. Unpopularity leads to 
compromised implementation. It seems that North Europeans, Scandinavians in 
particular, are more tolerant toward taxes, hence paying for pollution, than Americans 
(cf. Berck and Helfand, 2010). Most notably, carbon tax has amounted to about 3% of 
Sweden’s GDP (vis-à-vis about 1% in the US) and lowered Sweden’s aggregate 
carbon emissions to a level below the target set in the Kyoto Protocol. Carbon tax has 
also been implemented in Canada and New Zealand. Since 2008 a cap on the 
aggregate carbon emissions of electrical power producers in a region comprising ten 
north and central eastern states of the US has been set and tradable emission-permits 
were initially auctioned at a clearing price of about 3 dollars per ton.  
In July 2011 the Federal Government of Australia proposed the highest carbon 
price—an initial price of 23 Australian dollars per ton of emissions generated by 
about 500 largest polluters—for implementation on 1 July 2012. Households would   7
not be charged directly, but can expect higher prices of utilities. The less inelastic the 
demand for utilities, the greater the expected price hike. To moderate the regressive 
effect of the carbon price, all households with annual income lower than 80,000 
dollars would enjoy some reduction in income tax. Those with annual income lower 
than 18,300 dollars would be released from paying income tax and lodging a tax 
return. In addition to the aforementioned general concerns, the following problems are 
embedded in the Australian Federal Government’s carbon-pricing proposal. First, the 
proposal allows the vast majority of direct emitters of carbon dioxide to free-ride, 
though indirect moderating effect is expected. Second, some of the domestic major 
industrial polluters and ninety percents of the households would be compensated. The 
compensation would weaken their incentive to reduce emissions and would come at 
the expense of alternative use of tax revenues. Third, the tax would not be applied on 
the huge export of coal. Carbon emissions from burning Australian coal in the 
importing countries are not negligible and affect all. Fourth, while some countries and 
states price carbon emissions, most do not and free-ride. Fifth, although the Australian 
Federal Government’s proposed carbon price is about four times higher than the 
effective globally average, it is almost three-times lower than Nordhaus’ (2010) 
estimate of 64 USD per ton already required in 2010 for limiting global warming to 
two degrees Celsius. 
The implementation of carbon tax by some affluent countries might not lead to 
a reduction in global emissions. Levy (2011) has considered an interaction between 
tax-collecting rich countries, abstaining rich countries and abstaining poor countries. 
In his setting, the abstaining countries can lose reputation and suffer from guilt and 
might overstate the tax’s emission-moderating effect. The computed equilibrium 
reveals that even with loss of reputation and guilt, taxing emissions and directing the 
revenues to green investment would not necessarily reduce global emissions, nor the 
tax-collecting rich countries’ emissions. Nevertheless, a unilateral implementation of 
the tax can be viewed as a moral obligation of rich countries to lead the way in 
addressing the problem of global warming.  
 
3. How is a Carbon Tax expected to work?  
A basic model  (which ignores, for simplicity, issues such as market-power, 
uncertainty, risk aversion and time-preferences) is constructed to demonstrate the 
effect of carbon tax on agents’ carbon-dioxide emissions and, subsequently, to   8
compute the desirable carbon-tax rate for achieving a predetermined atmospheric 
stock, or a global welfare level. In that basic model, output increases concavely with 
the use of energy extracted from burning fossil fuel. The carbon-dioxide level emitted 
by each agent (household or firm) i=1,2,3,...,N is proportional to the quantity of fossil 
fuel used by the agent and hence production can be represented as a concave function 
of the agent’s level of carbon-dioxide emissions. The model employs the following 
notations and basic specifications. The carbon-based energy used by agent i at time t 
is denoted by  it E . The carbon emissions of agent i at time t,  it x , are given by: 
it i it xE                                 (1) 
where  i 0   reflects the emission-intensity of the agent’s production process’ fuel 
consumption.  
Agent i’s output at t is denoted by  it y  and is given by:    
2
it i it i it ya Eb E ,   ii a2 b 0   .                         (2) 
The price of energy for agent i at t is  it q . The price of agent i’s product at t is  it p.  The 
carbon-tax rate at t is flat and equal to  t 0   . 
Each agent i chooses her emission level at t to maximise her net cash-flow. 
Noting that  it i it xE   implies  it it i Ex /   , each agent’s production function can be 
expressed as: 
22
it i i it i i it y( a / ) x( a /) x             ( 3 )  
and her imputed price of carbon before tax is  it i q/  . Hence, the decision problem of 
agent i is expressed as: 
i
22
it i i it i i it it i t it x max{p [(a / )x (b / )x ] [(q / ) ]x }.               (4) 
The necessary and sufficient condition for maximum implies equality between the 
marginal return on emissions and the full price of emissions—the sum of their 
imputed price and tax rate:  
2*
it i i i i it it i t p[ ( a/ ) 2 ( b/ ) x] ( q / )      .            ( 5 )  
The net cash-flow maximising carbon-emission level at t for agent i is: 
* i
it it i t 2
ii iii t
a 1
x[ ( q / ) ]
2b / 2(b / )p
 
        
.         ( 6 )    9
The effect of the emission tax on agent i’s abatement is weakened by the marginal net 
revenue and by the rate in which the emissions’ marginal product diminishes. 




ti t t 1
i1




where  01   represents the depletion rate of atmospheric carbon-dioxide stock 
through photosynthesis, sinking and dissemination to space. 
 
4. Some Possible Ways of Setting Carbon-Tax Rate 
This section describes two possible approaches to carbon-tax setting. The first one 
computes an atmospheric carbon-dioxide stock-targeting tax rate with abstinence of 
some of the agents, whereas the second considers universal cooperation and computes 
a welfare-maximising carbon-tax rate. 
 
4.1. Atmospheric stock-targeting carbon-tax rate with abstinence  
Let us assume that the world’s N agents can be classified into a group of N1 identical 
agents, with  111 t1 t a ,b ,p ,q , who cooperate and pay a carbon-tax  1t 0    that limits the 
stock of atmospheric carbon dioxide at the end of period t to a targeted level  t ˆ S , and 
N-N1 identical agents, with  222 t2 t a ,b ,p ,q , who abstain ( 2t 0   ). In this scenario, the 
carbon tax-rate set by the group of the willing and cooperating agents satisfies the 
following equality: 
**
t1 1 t 1 2 t t 1 ˆ SN x( N N ) x S      .           ( 8 )  
Recalling (6), 
* 1
1t 1t 1 1t 2
11 111 t
a 1
x[ ( q / ) ] ( 9 )
2b / 2(b / )p
 




2t 2t 2 2
22 222 t
a 1
x[ ( q / )
2b / 2(b / )p
 
      
                   (10) 
and   10
* 1





a1 ˆ SN N [ ( q /) ]
2b / 2(b / )p
q/ a
(N N ) S .
2b / 2(b / )p

 
        
 
      
                 (11) 
Consequently, the carbon-tax rate paid by the group of the willing and cooperating 
members is: 
2t 2 12
11 t 1 2
11 22 222 t *
1t 1t 1 2
111 t 1
q/ aa
N( N N ) S
2 b/ 2 b/ 2 ( b/ ) p
(q / )
2(b / )p / N

  
            

.           (12) 
By substituting this tax rate into equation (9), the emissions abated by a willing and 





12 2 2 t 2 t 1 t 1 1 t 11 1 11
t1 22 3




(N N ) [a (q /p )] 2q b p NN a
S.
4b p 2b 2b N


    
  
      
            (13) 
When all of the N agents are identical (hence the agent-type index can be omitted) 







2b/ (q / )
2(b/ )p / N

       

.                                   (14) 
and the emissions abated by each agent are, of course, smaller: 
4
** tt
1t t t 1 22 3
tt
2q bp 1N N a
xS
2(b/ )p (2bp ) 2b N

                      
.               (15)
      
4.2. Global cooperation and a welfare-maximising carbon-tax rate 
In this case of a cooperative world, the world’s regulator substitutes 
*
it x   into her 
objective function, a global welfare function (W); say, the sum of all the agents’ net 
cash-flows, plus the carbon-tax revenues (redistributed through public services), and 
minus the damage inflicted by the stock of carbon-dioxide in the atmosphere. 
Assuming that the benefit from the carbon-tax revenues generated through 
redistribution and provision of public goods and investment by the world’s regulator 
are equal to the forgone privately generated ones, the carbon tax payments and   11
revenues can be omitted from W. The world’s regulator computes the carbon-tax rate 
that maximises the global welfare function: 
N
*2 * 2 *
ti t i i i t i i i t i t i i t t
i1




      
 
 
subject to the aforementioned atmospheric carbon-dioxide stock constraint. Here, 
t D(S ) represents the damage caused by the atmospheric carbon-dioxide stock via 
global warming. The damage is assumed to increase convexly in S (i.e., D,D 0    ) as 
represented by the following second-order polynomial: 
2
t1 t2 t 1 2 DSS , ,0      .                       (14) 
By substituting the carbon-dioxide stock equation into the damage function and the 
latter into  t W:  
N
*2 * 2




1i t t 1 2i t t 1
i1 i1





   
 
     
 

                  (15) 
As the second-order condition is satisfied, the global welfare maximising carbon-
dioxide tax can be computed from the following first-order condition: 
* N
2* it




12 i t t 1
i1 i1 i1
dx dW(t)
p [((a q )/ ) 2(b / )x ]
dd
dx dx





   


       









d2 ( b / ) p

  
and the necessary condition for maximum global welfare can be expressed as: 
NN N
it it
21 2 t 1 2




i1 i1 iii t iii t
qq 1
(1 2 ) ( 2 S )
2(b / ) 2(b / )p 2(b / )p
a 1
2( 1 2 )





          
 
      
 
 .(18) 
Hence,   12
N
it













2(b / )p (2 S )



























                .(19) 
In the special case where all the N agents are identical, 
o 12 t 1 2 i t i t i 2 i i i
t
2
(2 S ) ( 1 2p ) q / a / b
(1 2 )








i1 i1 ii i t iii t
q( 1 p) 1
2(b / )p 2(b / )p 
   
           
or  
o
t1t t (p 1)(q / )     
in the case of identical agents. In the latter case, the implementation of the tax leads 












5. Photosynthesis versus Emissions: Time-Variant Usable Land and Allocation 
In the previous two sections a fixed rate of depletion of carbon-dioxide, , was 
assumed. In the real world, the carbon-dioxide’s depletion rate depends on the 
intensity of photosynthesis and hence on the allocation of land between plants and 
humans. Humans and plants compete on the Earth’s useable land. With  t L  denoting 
the Earth’s total usable (for simplicity, uniform) land (in acres) and 
h
t L  the land 
occupied by humans at period t, then 
h
tt LL   is the land occupied by plants. Surface 
warming changes the Earth’s usable land. Since surface warming is a function of the 
stock of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere, the change in the Earth’s acreage of usable 
land is:   13
tt 1 t t 1 LL ( S S )    .                          (21) 
In already warm regions surface warming diminishes usable land, whereas in cold 
regions it increases the size of usable land. The scalar  is positive (negative) if the 
overall effect of surface warming on Earth’s usable land is negative (positive).  
The change in the stock of carbon-dioxide in the atmosphere at t reflects the 
imbalance between humans’ emissions and plants’ photosynthesis. With linearity in 
land assumed (for simplicity) this change is: 
hh
tt 1 t t t t S S [F(N )L ] (L L )                             (22) 
where 
h
tt F(N )L  is the aggregate human production function (with F is a concave in 
N),  0   is emissions per unit of human output, and  0    is photosynthesis per acre. 
By substituting the usable land equation into the carbon-dioxide stock equation, 
h
tt 1 t t t 1 (1 )(S S ) [ F(N ) ]L L        .                                                    (23) 
Let us reconsider the analytically simple case of targeting the atmospheric 
stock of carbon dioxide. The above equality implies that in order to achieve a target 
level of  t ˆ S  (lower than  t1 S  ) units of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere the land 
occupied by humans at t should not exceed:   
h t1 t1 t
t
t
ˆ L( 1) ( SS )
L
F(N )
     

 
                       (24) 
and the land occupied by plants at t should be at least: 
p t1 t1 t
tt
t
ˆ L( 1) ( SS )
LL
F(N )
     

 
.                       (25) 
The land allocated to plants increases with the difference between the actual 
atmospheric carbon stock at the end of the previous period and the target level but at a 
rate that is moderated by the rates of land loss and photosynthesis. However, the total 
effect of the photosynthesis rate is not clear a-priori: 
 
p
tt 1 t 1 t t 1 t t
2
t
ˆˆ LL ( 1 ) ( S S ) [ ( S S ) ] [ F ( N ) ]
0 (26)




             
 
     
 
as 
t1 t t1 t t
t1





        

 
.                (27)  14
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